El arte como significado / Art as meaning

Sirva, pues, este artículo como apología de la crítica y de su función en el momento actual. Una apología, además, que quiero extender, sobre todo, a la crítica "dura", aquélla que censura sin remilgos lo que considera que no posee valía artística. El crítico no debe evitar bajo ningún concepto la polémica (con el artista, con otros críticos, con el público), y debe hacer suya la máxima de Heráclito, pues precisamente en esa polémica reside el sentido de su labor. Me viene a la cabeza el ejemplo de cierto crítico de arte que ha sido sistemáticamente reprobado por su enfrentamiento con un determinado artista, cuando probablemente sus textos han servido más de acicate creativo para este artista que los halagos gratuitos de toda la corte real de trasnochados seguidores que en vida tuvo (quienes nunca se atrevieron a llevar la contraria "al genio" y ahora, tras su muerte, obvian sus indicaciones sobre el trato a sus obras, exponiéndolas en espacios que explícitamente éste declaró aborrecer).

No solo creo que aquel crítico hizo bien en dar a conocer sus ideas, sino que incluso estoy convencido de que tenía la obligación -moral- de hacerlo así. Si existe alguna actitud realmente censurable en la crítica de arte, ésta es la del halago gratuito, la de dotar a la obra de una validez que no entendemos, la de fingir ante ella una emoción que no existe. Hay otras actitudes que hacen daño a nuestra disciplina, pero ninguna de ellas hace tanto mal como el halago sistemático que tan bien se les da a quienes perdieron hace tiempo la facultad de emocionarse verdaderamente ante los productos de la creatividad humana.

 

* Art as Meaning: Political not Metaphysical.

We are facing a historical moment in which a sort of artistic relativism whereby "anything can be a work of art" is commonly accepted. This conception stems from the fact that there is no objective sphere to turn to when facing a controversy regarding the object which we must decide is art or not, to conclude that any state of things could be a work of art. Renowned North American critic Arthur C. Danto questions where art criticism stands by asking: "What does it mean to live in a world in which anything can the a work of art?" (Arthur C. Danto, "Art and Meaning," ).

Stemming from the fact that, currently, works of art can no longer be "tacitly distinguished from other things," and that the aspects that turn them into art are "something the eye cannot see," Danto answers his question arguing that being a critic in a world where anything can be art "is inventing a suitable criticism for an object, be it or not a work of art (...). It is imagining what the object could mean if it were a vehicle for an artistic declaration". Albeit agreeing with the proposals on which Danto bases his line of argument, I think this answer openly contradicts another which articulates and places the essence of the work's "artness" in its meaning, whereby "meaning" is the content of the work of art, what it is about and what it embodies [ 7 ] .

In this article I aim to, on the one hand, qualify the customary conclusions of artistic relativism -by comparing it to another relativism, moral relativism- and, on the other, outline the frame of relationships in which to insert the pursuit -or rather, the construction- for the meaning of works of art (of each one), since explaining artworks is, according to Danto, "the task of the critics." I will respond to Danto's question using his same notion -which places a work's "artness" in its meaning-, although I understand said meaning as something completely different: it is not behind the work, it must be constructed in a group task.

North American philosopher Richard Rorty will guide me in this quest, to the extent that I consider art criticism should be "rational" in the pragmatist sense of the term. Even at the risk of getting ahead of my line of argument, I would like to recall that, for pragmatists, rational "designates a series of moral virtues" and "means something more similar to civilised than to methodical" (Richard Rorty, "Science as Solidarity," in: Objectivity, Relativism and Truth ). The creation of a concept of rationality understood as such has the immediate goal of replacing the idea of "truth" (truth as the equivalent of the facts [ 8 ] ) with the notion of the "unforced agreement." If we apply this to our domain, the question regarding the meaning of works of art is displaced from a metaphysical plane (where we would have to go over and over that unsolvable question, Danto's how "the work of art embodies its meaning"), to a plane, which we could call "political," in that art criticism's goal is not to make explicit the actual content or meaning of the artwork, but to achieve "a suitable combination of unforced agreement and tolerant disagreement" (R. Rorty) -which some philosophers point out as politics' goal. Hence the title of the text, which paraphrases John Rawls' renowned article, "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical."

We can deny the genuine possibility of a final and definitive foundation of human rights and, at the same time, assert the need for the formulation of the same and, consequently, request the establishment of necessary measures to ensure they are fulfilled scrupulously by all people (beyond the fact that they do or do not believe in that charter of rights). In that same sense, we can categorically deny the existence of anything like an objective sphere of moral values that grants the status of Truth to our values without contradicting that belief when we are morally outraged by the atrocities committed by the Nazis, for example. That is to say, believing in the impossibility of the final foundation of one's values does not necessarily mean one will not defend them to a logical conclusion. It is merely the conviction that there is no objective sphere to turn to when two value systems contradict, without this forcing ethical inaction, without it hindering our natural reaction opposite what we privately consider immoral or unfair, and, especially, without it undermining our personal values in any way (as some tutors teaching moral health hurry to state). It is one thing to believe our values cannot be proven as True and another to not believe in them.